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Abstract 
 
We study the adoption and non adoption of energy efficiency initiatives using a database of over 
100,000 recommendations provided to more than 13,000 small and medium sized manufacturing 
firms. The recommendations run the entire gamut of operational improvements including equip 
ment modification, operating procedures and management practices. Even though the average 
payback across all recommendations is just over one year many of these profitable opportunities 
are not implemented. Using a probit instrumental variable model we find evidence of several bi 
ases in the adoption of these recommendations. First, managers are myopic as they miss out on 
many profitable opportunities. Second, managers are more influenced by upfront costs than by 
net benefits when evaluating such initiatives. Third, we find that adoption of a recommendation 
depends not only on its characteristics but also on the sequence in which the recommendations 
are presented. Adoption rates are higher for those initiatives appearing early on in a list of rec 
ommendations. Finally, we also find that adoption is not influenced by the number of options 
provided to decision makers, contrary to theoretical predictions. We thus highlight previously 
unobserved decision biases in the OM literature using field data rather than the more traditional 
experimental data. We draw implications for enhancing adoption of energy efficiency initiatives 
and for other decision contexts where a collection of process improvement recommendations are 
made to firms. 
 
Keywords: Process Improvement, Energy Efficiency, Decision Bias, Adoption, 
Environment, Behavioral Operations 
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1.  Introduction 
This paper investigates the adoption and non adoption of energy saving opportunities result 
ing from recommendations made to small and medium sized manufacturing firms. Most of these 
energy saving opportunities pertain to process improvements in operations, such as improved 
management of existing systems, modification or replacement of equipment, minimization of 
waste or resource usage, enhanced quality management, adoption of preventive maintenance and 
improvement  of  productivity  and  management  practices.  Adoption  of  process  improvements 
contributing to energy efficiency can have a significant impact. For instance, the Intergovern 
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) identifies energy efficiency as a key strategy to combat 
increased greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations. The IPCC estimates the worldwide potential in 
the industrial sector to reduce CO2 emissions using energy conservation strategies at over 2.5 
gigatonnes of CO2 equivalents per year in 2030, which is nearly 4% of overall anthropogenic 
CO2 emissions forecast for 2030 (Bernstein et al. 2007), equivalent to taking over half a billion 
cars of the road. The United States has been aware of the immense potential and has been striv 
ing to improve energy efficiency since the early seventies. Industry accounts for a third of the 
energy usage in the United States, which is why the US Department of Energy (DoE) has been 
working to improve energy intensity in industry through the Industrial Technologies Program 
(ITP). The Industrial Assessment Centers (IAC) program is part of the ITP and provides small 
and medium sized firms with free energy efficiency assessments. The IAC program has been in 
existence since 1976 and is estimated to have provided cumulative energy savings of 1280 tril 
lion BTU by 2005 (Impacts 2005).  
The energy efficiency assessments are done by faculty and students from accredited engi 
neering schools (Muller et al. 2004). Specific improvement recommendations covering the entire 
gamut of operational improvements including equipment modification, operating procedures and 
management practices are provided in a report to the firm. Subsequently the implementation sta 
tus of the recommendations is tracked by the respective IAC.  
The recommendations usually have very attractive rates of return and their average payback 
period is just over a year. A former IAC director (one of the authors) illustrates how easy it can 
be to achieve substantial savings: “A quarter inch diameter hole in a compressed air system im 
plies $5000/yr in wasted energy costs”. However, even with attractive rates of return, many 
energy efficiency related process improvement recommendations are not implemented, as dem Work in Progress; For Submission to Management Science (Nov 2008) 
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onstrated in Figure 1. This is in line with what has been documented in the energy efficiency lite 
rature. Many studies indicate that a significant proportion of energy efficiency opportunities are 
not exploited (Expert Group on Energy Efficiency 2007). Various studies have postulated theo 
ries and explanations for this apparent anomaly; however the literature struggles to explain the 
high rates of non adoption of profitable energy efficiency initiatives. The literature has drawn 
extensively from fields ranging from economics to organizational learning in its attempt to ex 
plain the gap in adoption. Behavioral explanations using concepts ranging from bounded ratio 
nality to inertia have also been proposed in the literature (Rohdin and Thollander 2006). Howev 
er Kempton et al. (1992) point out that much of the psychological research has focused on resi 
dential energy users at home. Behavioral aspects related to the adoption of energy efficiency in 
itiatives in an industrial context are largely unexplored.  
In this paper we study the role of biases in the adoption of energy efficiency initiatives in an 
operational context. We find that managers are myopic as they miss out on many profitable ener 
gy efficiency initiatives. They are more influenced by upfront costs than by net benefits when 
evaluating these initiatives. Further, we find that the adoption of a recommendation is influenced 
by the sequence in which it is presented. We also find that decision makers are not influenced by 
the number of recommendations made to them.  
This paper aims to make four key contributions. First, it studies the adoption of energy effi 
ciency initiatives to enable a better understanding of the reasons why a significant proportion of 
the energy efficiency potential remains untapped. This understanding may help improve adoption 
rates. Second, since the recommendations cover a wide range of operations, this understanding 
may facilitate adoption of process improvement initiatives more generally. Third, the paper de 
monstrates previously undocumented decision biases in the OM literature. Fourth, it highlights 
behavioral issues using actual field data as opposed to the majority of the behavioral operations 
literature which uses experiments.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review relevant literature. In 
Section 3 we present the hypotheses. In Section 4 we describe the data. In Section 5 we present 
our methodology and results. In Section 6 we discuss the results, implications of our findings and 
limitations of our analysis. In Section 7 we conclude and indicate areas for further research. Work in Progress; For Submission to Management Science (Nov 2008) 
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2.  Literature Review 
Our work draws on and contributes to several streams of literature: that on the adoption of inno 
vations in general, on the adoption of energy efficiency innovations in particular and on the be 
havioral  literature  pertaining  to  decisions  in the context  of  choosing  between  multiple  (non 
exclusive) alternatives. We provide a broad overview of the relevant literature in these areas 
here, but defer a more detailed discussion of literature pertaining to our specific hypotheses to 
the next section. 
Rogers (2003) suggests that the relative advantage of an innovation, the ratio of the expected 
benefits and the costs of adopting an innovation, is one of the strongest predictors of an innova 
tion’s rate of adoption. Evidence supporting this has been seen across a wide range of innova 
tions ranging from hybrid corn in agriculture (Griliches 1957) to continuous mining machines in 
bituminous coal (Mansfield 1961). The environmental literature highlights the presence of many 
profitable innovations. Porter and Van der Linde (1995) and many others provide numerous ex 
amples where environmental innovations provide net benefits to firms. King and Lenox (2002) 
find that firms that adopt waste prevention practices gain unexpected benefits.  Corbett and Klas 
sen (2006) synthesize the growing stream of literature which indicates that investments in envi 
ronmental improvements often provide unexpected but significant profit improvements. In line 
with the environmental literature several studies in the energy efficiency literature reveal the ex 
istence of many profitable improvement opportunities. Shama (1983), Lovins and Lovins (1993) 
and many others provide examples of such opportunities which may be realized at negligible 
costs or provide rates of returns often over 30%. However, DeCanio (1993) points out “Many 
investments in energy efficiency fail to be made despite their apparent profitability”. Jaffe and 
Stavins (1994a) identify the gap between the actual energy use on the one hand and the optimal 
energy use on the other hand as the “energy efficiency gap”.  
The energy efficiency literature has drawn on many fields to explain the paradox of low 
adoption rates of profitable energy efficiency improvements. Jaffe and Stavins (1994b) draw on 
market failure and non market failure explanations; some of these include lack of information 
about the innovation, principal agent issues, uncertainty about prices and savings and irreversi 
bility of investments.  DeCanio (1998) appeals to organizational and institutional factors to ac 
count for part of the energy efficiency gap. Mulder et al. (2003) emphasize technology adoption 
and learning by using as constructs to explain the energy efficiency gap. Dierderen et al. (2003) Work in Progress; For Submission to Management Science (Nov 2008) 
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use a real options framework to explain low adoption rates in their study of the adoption of gas 
combustion chambers and heat storage tanks in the Dutch horticulture industry. Mueller (2006) 
identifies that complexity of regulation deters adoption in the context of combined heat and pow 
er technologies. Anderson and Newell (2004), the only scholarly study to our knowledge that has 
used the IAC data, link the economic incentives to the energy efficiency initiatives and find that 
adoption depends more on initial cost than on annual savings and consequently they suggest that 
implementation cost subsidies may be effective in promoting energy efficient technologies. An 
underlying assumption in most of these studies is that agents are rational, but as Kahneman 
(1994) points out people may not be entirely rational in their choices.  Managers may cope with 
uncertainty and complexity of decision making by adopting simplifying heuristics which may 
lead to systematic bias (Gilovich et al. 2002). In this paper, we explore such biases in the adop 
tion of energy efficiency improvement opportunities. 
Energy efficiency initiatives typically involve the entire spectrum of operations from optimi 
zation of industrial hardware and its uses to enhancing productivity (Oppenheim 2007). A grow 
ing body of literature emphasizes behavioral aspects in operations. Bendoly et al. (2006) provide 
an overview of behavioral issues in the operations literature and highlight that although theory 
provides many simple tools that are easy to apply, many practitioners adopt rules of thumb. Fur 
ther, behavioral issues have been highlighted across a variety of operational contexts, ranging 
from the simple newsvendor setting (Schweitzer and Cachon 2000) to complex supply chain set 
tings (Croson and Donohue 2006). As energy efficiency opportunities are related to a wide range 
of issues in operations, behavioral aspects may be pertinent to understand their adoption.   
We examine managerial myopia and cost focus by drawing on various streams of literature, 
discussed in more detail in the next section, which highlight this behavior. Laverty (1996) syn 
thesizes five broad explanations in the literature that drive economic short termism; these include 
flawed management practices, managerial opportunism, stock market myopia, fluid and impa 
tient capital and information asymmetry. The short termism may influence managers to adopt 
low cost projects. We investigate the influence of the sequence in which choices are presented by 
relating to the literature on order effects. Bruine de Bruin and Keren (2003) observe that people 
make judgments by comparing options as they are presented in a sequence. They find that if op 
tions have unique positive features, then those presented towards the end of a sequence are rated 
higher while if they have unique negative features those presented at the end are rated lower. We Work in Progress; For Submission to Management Science (Nov 2008) 
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study the effect of the number of choices provided by relating to the literature which explores 
participation and allocation when decision makers are provided a set of choices. Sethi Iyengar et 
al. (2004) explore a choice problem in the context of participation in 401(k) plans. They find that 
plan participation levels drop with increased number of investment options provided in the plan. 
We extrapolate observations from these literatures to our context on the adoption of energy effi 
ciency initiatives and develop relevant hypotheses. 
3.  Hypotheses 
Our hypotheses are grounded in the literature on adoption of innovations and energy efficiency 
initiatives while drawing upon the behavioral literature related to heuristics, biases and order ef 
fects. We develop five hypotheses related to the adoption of energy efficiency initiatives.  
Our first hypothesis relates to managerial myopia in the adoption of energy efficiency oppor 
tunities. Several studies in the energy efficiency literature show the existence of many profitable 
energy saving opportunities. Koomey and Sanstad (1994) highlight through four examples the 
presence of profitable energy conservation opportunities for both consumers and producers.  The 
IPCC highlights a range of energy efficiency opportunities in the industrial sector such as im 
proved housekeeping measures which may yield energy savings in the range of 10 20% to capi 
tal measures which may yield energy savings in the range of 40 50% (Bernstein et al. 2007). 
However, a significant proportion of these opportunities are not realized (Expert Group on Ener 
gy Efficiency 2007). The mere presence of unrealized opportunities need not indicate that man 
agers are myopic. However, if managers have access to funds which cost less than the returns 
provided by the unrealized profitable opportunities one could argue that managers missed op 
tions to utilize the funds and realize gains through these profitable opportunities. Many small 
businesses, in addition to using credit lines, loan and capital leases, obtain financing by using 
trade credit (Mach and Wolken 2003). The Federal Reserve Board’s 2003 Survey of Small Busi 
ness Finances indicates that trade credit was used by 60 percent of small businesses. Trade credit 
is one of the most expensive sources of funds mentioned in the literature. Petersen and Rajan 
(1995) highlight that funds obtained through trade credit have an annualized rate of 44.6%. They 
argue a firm may utilize this expensive source of funds as long as the returns from investments 
exceed the cost of funds. In our context,  if we find that the rates of return for unrealized initia 
tives is higher than the cost of trade credit then we may conclude managers missed out on profit Work in Progress; For Submission to Management Science (Nov 2008) 
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able opportunities. This is especially true given that most recommendations are quite trivial to 
implement; for instance, they may require calling or coordinating with a vendor, and hence “the 
cost of managerial effort” is not a major obstacle for most recommendations.  Note that we are 
not concerned with a single firm which may not adopt these opportunities for a variety of rea 
sons, but with a collection of firms. For the collection of firms in our study, if we find a signifi 
cant proportion of unrealized opportunities have rates of return higher than the cost of accessible 
funds then we may conclude that managers are exhibiting myopia with regard to the adoption of 
energy efficiency initiatives. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Managers display myopia in the adoption of energy saving initiatives. They 
fail to adopt profitable energy efficiency initiatives even though the rates of return of such initia-
tives are higher than the cost of funds for small businesses. 
 
Our second hypothesis relates to the managers focus on upfront costs. Numerous studies in 
the literature point out a range of reasons why managers focus on costs while evaluating im 
provement opportunities. In the context of energy saving initiatives, Stern and Aronson (1984) 
argue that expenditures which fit in the present budget cycle may require fewer approvals and 
prompt managers to focus on low cost projects. Hirshleifer (1993) points out managers may be 
concerned about their reputation and consequently not undertake investments with large costs as 
such projects may affect their cash flows and reflect poorly on their performance. Thakor (1993) 
highlights that managerial incentives to build reputation may lead to myopic investment deci 
sions. Antle and Eppen (1995) highlight that organizations may adopt capital rationing in the 
presence of asymmetric information and moral hazard. Zhang (1997) uses a principal agent mod 
el to highlight that capital rationing may be advantageous for some organizations which face 
asymmetric information between managers and owners.  In such instances, managers may under 
take lower cost projects to meet the capital rationing constraint. Marginson and Mcaulay (2008) 
indicate that accounting information measures may influence managers to adopt a short term out 
look and take actions solely to maximize short term results. Extrapolating to our context, we pre 
dict managers will be influenced to a greater degree by initial costs than by net benefits in the 
adoption of energy efficiency initiatives. 
 Work in Progress; For Submission to Management Science (Nov 2008) 
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Hypothesis 2: Managers focus on upfront costs rather than on net benefits when evaluating 
energy efficiency initiatives. 
 
Our third hypothesis relates to the risk associated with a recommendation. Markowitz (1952), 
in his classic paper on portfolio selection, argues that an investor would prefer investments with 
higher expected returns and lower variance of returns. Sharpe et al. (1995) point out that the 
model proposed by Markowitz has two implicit assumptions. The first assumption relates to non 
satiation where decision makers prefer more wealth to less and the second assumptions relates to 
risk  aversion  where  investors  will  choose  portfolios  with  lower  standard  deviations.  Sharpe 
(1965) in his empirical study of risk aversion in the stock market uses the historical standard dev 
iation of returns as a predictor of risk. Sarin and Weber (1993) propose a risk value model for 
evaluating decisions under risk where preference for a gamble depends on its riskiness and its 
value. In a simple form of the model they indicate that risk is measured by variance and they also 
highlight that one of the stylized facts that emerges consistently in empirical studies is that risk 
increases  with  variance.  Grootveld  and  Hallerbach  (1999)  study  the  differences  between  the 
mean variance and the mean return downside risk portfolio selection model. Contrary to popular 
belief they highlight that only few downside risk measures possess better theoretical properties in 
a return risk framework than the variance. In our context, managers are given estimates of ex 
pected returns, as each recommendation includes estimates of payback, annual savings and costs. 
Managers may form estimates of the riskiness of a recommendation either based on their judg 
ment, or based on discussions with managers in other firms, or through other means. We predict 
adoption rates to be lower for recommendations which have higher perceived risk. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The variance in payback associated with a recommendation will negatively in-
fluence the adoption rate. 
 
 Our fourth hypothesis relates to the order in which recommendations are presented to man 
agers. Anderson (1971) used information integration theory to link judgments to the order in 
which information is received. He defines the primacy effect as occurring when information pre 
sented early in a sequence has a higher effect on judgment and the recency effect when the con 
verse happens. Many studies in the literature highlight the presence of these effects. Symonds Work in Progress; For Submission to Management Science (Nov 2008) 
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(1936), in an experiment with school children, varied the order of presentation of a list of items 
and studied the effect on ranking of these items. He found items had a lower rank when they 
were placed earlier in the list. Alison and Ashton (1988) investigated the role of information or 
der in an audit context and found support for the recency effect while Anderson and Maletta 
(1999) found evidence that auditors are susceptible to primacy effects. Kardes and Kalyanaram 
(1992) performed experiments where consumers were given sequential exposure to information 
on various brands and find evidence of a primacy effect. Perrin et al. (2001) use a simulation ex 
ercise to find US Naval officers arrived at conclusions which were influenced by information 
that was presented later in a sequence. Terry (2005) investigated the impact of the serial position 
of a commercial in a batch of commercials and finds evidence for both primacy and recency ef 
fects. Bruine de Bruin (2006) observes serial position effects when options are judged in a se 
quence, as in the case of figure skating competitions, and finds evidence that later performers 
obtain higher scores. Meredith and Salant (2007) find evidence that the order in which candi 
dates are presented in a ballot influences election outcomes with candidates being listed first 
gaining a significant advantage. Rubinstein and Salant (2006) formulate a model of choice from 
lists and explore a particular form of choice functions which leads to a preference relation. Salant 
(2008) studies the problem of choosing from a list and indicates that any choice rule which is 
simpler than rational choice leads to order effects. He derives conditions under which making 
one choice from a list leads to a primacy effect, recency effect, choice overload or status quo bi 
as. 
Overall, the literature finds evidence of both primacy and recency effects but has not been 
able to clearly delineate the contexts in which primacy or recency effects will dominate. In our 
context, decision makers are provided a written report with the recommendations in a particular 
sequence. Based on the literature discussed above we can predict that the serial position of a rec 
ommendation in the report will influence the decision makers response to a recommendation. 
However, the direction of the influence cannot be unambiguously ascertained. To address this we 
appeal to the anchoring and adjustment arguments of Tversky and Kahneman (1974). They point 
out that people often start from an initial value and adjust it to obtain the final answer to a prob 
lem. In our context, a decision maker may adopt a recommendation if she believes it has a suffi 
ciently attractive payback. The payback of the first recommendation she observes provides an 
initial anchor for the threshold value. Each recommendation will then be evaluated relative to the Work in Progress; For Submission to Management Science (Nov 2008) 
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best seen so far. This will imply that the threshold increases as she evaluates more recommenda 
tions. Consequently recommendations which come later in a sequence will face increased thre 
shold levels and hence will have lower adoption rates. This argument is not symmetric, as firms 
are unlikely to benchmark investment opportunities against the worst option seen.  
 
Hypothesis 4: The serial position of a recommendation in the report will influence adoption 
rates. Recommendations which occur in the beginning of the report will have higher adoption 
rates as compared to recommendations which occur towards the end of the report. 
 
Our fifth hypothesis relates to the number of recommendations provided to the managers. 
The literature on the asset allocation problem where decision makers allocate assets over a set of 
choices is relevant to our context. Benartzi and Thaler (2007) highlight many instances of this 
problem and discuss issues specifically related to retirement savings. They find that many deci 
sion makers adopt a naïve strategy of allocating their assets equally over n choices, which they 
call the “1/n rule”. Huberman and Jiang (2006) analyze similar problems when the number of 
choices is large. They find that decision makers first restrict their choices to a smaller subset of n 
choices and then they allocate the assets equally over the subset of n choices. They call this the 
“conditional 1/n rule”. Iyengar and Lepper (2000) study the cases when consumers are provided 
a wide array of choice (24 flavors of jam) and limited choice (6 flavors of jam). They find that 
consumers were more likely to make a purchase when they have limited choice. Extrapolating to 
our decision context, we predict that if a decision maker is provided with a large number of rec 
ommendations (choices) her adoption rate will be lower than if she is provided a limited number 
of recommendations (choices). 
 
 Hypothesis 5: Recommendations contained in assessments with fewer recommendations in 
total will have a higher adoption rate than recommendations contained in assessments with more 
recommendations. 
4.  Data 
The US Department of Energy’s IAC program funds a network of universities to conduct free 
energy assessments for small and medium sized manufacturing firms. Assessments are done by Work in Progress; For Submission to Management Science (Nov 2008) 
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engineering faculty and students from participating universities across the US. Over 50 universi 
ties have participated in the program at various times since it started in 1976. In fiscal year 2007 
around 350 assessments were performed, for an outlay of over $ 4 million (DoE 2009). 
Firms  eligible  for  the  assessments  are  chosen  based  on  multiple  criteria.  These  include 
whether the plants products are within standard industrial classification codes 20 through 39, 
whether the plant is within 150 miles of the host campus, has gross annual sales below $100 mil 
lion, has employee count less than 500, has annual energy bills between $100,000 and $2 million 
and has no professional in house staff to perform the assessment (Muller et al. 2004). When a 
firm expresses an interest in the assessment, the IAC team collects firm level information to veri 
fy if the firm meets the qualifying criteria and to understand the current energy usage. The next 
step is a site visit by the IAC team led by a faculty member. Typically the visit entails interviews 
with the plant management, plant tours and collection of operational data. Some energy saving 
opportunities are identified by observing the plant operations. The fourth author, a former IAC 
director indicated that in some instances it was surprisingly easy to identify opportunities: “In 
some plants we hear a constant hiss which indicates compressed air is leaking out.” Other rec 
ommendations are identified by analyzing the operational data and linking it with observations in 
the plant visit. As the former IAC director says “In one plant we saw excess flash (extra material) 
on parts made using an injection molding process and later using the specific heat values for the 
molding material we identified they were using around forty times the energy required for the 
process”. Subsequent to the visit, the team provides a written report which provides details of 
specific recommendations to improve efficiency across energy streams, waste streams and prod 
uctivity. After 6 to 9 months the plants are contacted by the IAC to ascertain which of the rec 
ommendations have been implemented or will be implemented in the next one year. The infor 
mation on the recommendations and their implementation status is provided to the IAC database 
managers using a standard template.  
Information on the recommendations and the assessments is maintained in a database at a 
public website hosted by the Center for Advanced Energy Systems at Rutgers University. The 
database has details of each assessment performed since 1981, currently there are over 13,000 
assessments with over 100,000 recommendations. The information maintained for each assess 
ment includes plant demographics such as annual sales, employees, plant area, production hours, 
energy consumed, manufacturing sector, date of assessment etc. For each recommendation the Work in Progress; For Submission to Management Science (Nov 2008) 
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information maintained includes expected savings, quantity of energy conserved, implementation 
costs, payback calculations, whether the recommendation was implemented or not, etc. The de 
tails on the information maintained in the IAC database and on the IAC assessment process are 
available in “The DOE Industrial Assessment Database Manual” (Muller et al. 2004). The IAC 
has developed a coding system for the recommendations called Assessment Recommendation 
Code (ARC). This classifies recommendations into over 600 types. The ARC number for each 
recommendation and the order in which the recommendations appeared in the report are also 
stored in the database.  
We use the data from the IAC database for the years 1981 2006. We do not use the data for 
the years 2007 08 as the data pertaining to the implementation process is not yet complete. In our 
analysis, we adjust all monetary figures for inflation, scaling to year 2006 US dollars using the 
producer price index for finished goods using the WPUSOP3000 series provided by the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS 2008). We exclude 778 recommendations which have payback values 
greater than 9 years, 44 recommendations that involve additional costs and do not provide any 
positive savings, and 8 recommendations which have negative costs for implementation as these 
are all outliers and possibly errors: including them would not change our conclusions. Overall 
the data pertaining to 92,723 recommendations are used in the analysis. However, some observa 
tions are not included in specific analyses, these are indicated where we present our results. Ta 
ble 1 provides descriptive statistics for our data. 
The average estimated implementation cost across all recommendations is US$ 20,767 while 
the  average  estimated  annual  savings  is  US$  19,297.  The  average  estimated  payback  period 
across all the recommendation is just over a year; however even with the short payback periods 
firms only adopted 50.01% of all recommendations. The actual adoption rates are probably lower 
still as implementation rates are based on projected implementation data provided by the firms 
and in some instances partial implementation may be recorded as complete implementation. Ad 
ditionally in some instances it is possible that firms might report higher implementation to avoid 
the embarrassment of reporting low implementation rates.  
5.  Methodology and Results 
We test our hypothesis related to managerial myopia separately from the other hypotheses. We 
use a nonparametric sign test to test the hypothesis related to managerial myopia. To test the oth Work in Progress; For Submission to Management Science (Nov 2008) 
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er hypotheses, we employ two econometric models that relate adoption to the economic drivers 
and specific characteristics of recommendations. First, we estimate a conditional logit model, 
building on Anderson and Newell (2004), and find that costs, savings, variance of the payback, 
and the serial position of a recommendation influence the implementation rate. However this 
model does not correct for the fact that the serial position may be endogenous as the IAC were 
asked to present more attractive recommendations first. Second, to account for the endogenous 
explanatory variable, we estimate a probit instrumental variables model. All the analyses were 
done using STATA version 10.0. 
To test our hypothesis related to managerial myopia, we compute the IRR for the recommen 
dations which were not implemented. In our IRR calculation we assume that the annual savings 
accrue for 3 years. We compare the median IRR of unrealized opportunities against trade credit 
which is one of most expensive source of funds for small businesses mentioned in the literature 
(Petersen and Rajan 1995). The results of this comparison are provided in Table 2. From the re 
sults we see that the median rate of return for the unrealized recommendations at 84% is signifi 
cantly higher than the cost of trade credit.  
5.1 Conditional Logit Model 
We build on Anderson and Newell’s (2004) econometric model by incorporating variables to 
capture the uncertainty of the returns of a recommendation and the sequence in which the rec 
ommendations are presented.  
We estimate a set of conditional logit models for the adoption decision, with an indicator va 
riable Yi that equals 1 if recommendation i is adopted and equals 0 otherwise. The choice prob 
lem is defined by the latent variable model: 
 
Yi
* = α + Mi*β + Vi*γ + Ti* δ  + Si* φ + Ci* λ + εi                                                               (1) 
 
where Yi
* is the net benefit of adopting recommendation i, Mi  is the vector of financial variables 
for recommendation i, Vi is the variance of the payback associated with recommendation i, and 
Ti is a vector which indicates the type of recommendation i. The recommendations are classified 
into twenty five different mutually exclusive types based on the first two digits of the ARC 
number. Thus recommendations are classified as pertaining to combustion systems, thermal sys 
tems etc. This captures the heterogeneity amongst the recommendations and accounts for the ef Work in Progress; For Submission to Management Science (Nov 2008) 
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fects due to particular recommendation type.  Si represents the serial position of the recommen 
dation in the report. In this model we do not include the number of recommendations as that ef 
fect will be embedded in the firm level fixed effects Ci. εi represents the error term.  
Decision makers will adopt a recommendation only if the benefits from adopting it are posi 
tive, and thus the probability that a recommendation is adopted is  
 
Prob [ Yi = 1 ] = Prob [α + Mi*β + Vi*γ + Ti* δ  + Si* φ + Ci* λ + εi > 0 ]  
                        = F (α + Mi*β + Vi*γ + Ti* δ  + Si* φ + Ci* λ + εi)                                        (2) 
 
where F is the cumulative probability distribution function for ε.  If we assume the cumulative 
distribution of ε follows a logistic distribution we have the logit model and if the cumulative dis 
tribution follows a standard normal distribution we have the probit model (Maddala 2003).  
Following  Anderson  and  Newell  (2004),  we  estimate  a  “Payback”  model  and  a  “Cost 
Benefit” model. In the “Payback” model we use the logarithmic form of simple payback of the 
recommendation to construct the variables ln(Payback)i and [ln(Payback)i]
2 for the vector Mi. 
Similarly  for  the  “Cost Benefit”  model  we  construct  the  variables  ln(Cost)i  ,  [ln(Cost)i]
2  , 
ln(Savings)i and [ln(Savings)i]
2, using the logarithmic form of expected costs and savings for the 
vector Mi. Further, Payback, Cost and Savings have been normalized to equal to one at their re 
spective  means  to  ease  interpretation  of  the  coefficients.  In  line  with  Anderson  and  Newell 
(2004), we use the logarithmic form of the financial variables as it improves the model’s fit with 
the data; using the linear form provides similar results. Table 3 presents the estimation results for 
the “Payback” and “Cost Benefit” models. We recognize that significance may be driven by the 
large number of observations, consequently we report results using a stringent significance level 
evaluation with p<0.001. 
5.2 Instrumental Variables Probit Model 
The above econometric model treats the serial position of the recommendation as exogenous, but 
this may not be the case. For instance the IACs may put more attractive recommendations earlier 
in the report. If the IACs assessment of the attractiveness of each recommendation is observable 
then it can be included in the econometric model to obtain consistent estimates of model parame 
ters. As this is not the case, the effect of these assessments of attractiveness will be captured in Work in Progress; For Submission to Management Science (Nov 2008) 
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the error terms. This implies that the serial position is correlated with the error term and is there 
fore endogenous in the model. We can address the problem of the endogenous explanatory vari 
able by identifying an instrumental variable that is related to the serial position of the recom 
mendation, but is otherwise unrelated to the error terms (Wooldridge 2002).  
We explore two instruments for the serial position of the recommendation. The first instru 
ment is based on the order in which the recommendations appear in the IAC Assessment Rec 
ommendation Code (ARC) manual. The ARC manual groups recommendations so that they fo 
cus on the same energy system, for example combustion systems, or they follow a similar strate 
gy for enhancement, for example maintenance. The recommendations are ordered by a unique 
ARC code. We use the ARC code to sequence the recommendations made to a firm so that the 
recommendation with the lowest ARC code is given the first rank and so forth. The assessors use 
the ARC codes to report their recommendations to the IAC Database managers. Consequently 
their reporting of recommendations in the report may partly follow the sequence in the ARC ma 
nual. As the ARC manual is maintained centrally the ARC will not be related to the preferences 
of a specific firm, hence the instrument should not be correlated with the error terms.  
The second instrument is related to the propensity with which each IAC makes a recommen 
dation. We compile the frequency with which each IAC makes a particular recommendation 
across all assessments. We use this to sequence the recommendations made to a specific firm so 
that the recommendation with the highest frequency gets the first serial position and so forth. The 
resulting sequence is a reflection of the specific IACs familiarity with specific recommendations 
and this may be related to the way in which they present the recommendations to a specific firm. 
This sequence is based on the IACs interaction with all firms it has assessed and as such it will 
not be related to the preferences of a specific firm; hence the instrument should not be correlated 
with the error term. 
We estimate a Probit model as it allows us to incorporate the instrumental variable estimation 
and also enables us to incorporate the effects of the number of recommendations which was not 
possible in our earlier model (1).  The specification of the Probit instrumental variables model is  
 
Yi
* = α + Mi*β + Vi*γ + Ti* δ  + Si* φ + Ni*ω + NPi* ψ + Ri* λ + εi                    (3) 
Si = Mi* Πβ + Vi* Πγ + Ti* Π δ + Ni* Πω + NPi* Πψ + Ri* Πλ + νi             (4) 
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In this model the variable Si is endogenous as opposed to model (1) where Si is exogenous. 
The linear projection in equation (4) represents the reduced form equation for the endogenous 
explanatory variable Si. The variable Ni represents the number of recommendations made to a 
firm. NPi represents the interaction term for the number of recommendations in the assessment 
with the payback. The vector Ri includes controls for the year, specific IAC, two digit SIC codes, 
sales, employees and plant area. The variables Mi, Vi and Ti are as discussed for the conditional 
logit model. As in the conditional logit model, decision makers will adopt a recommendation on 
ly if the benefits from adopting a recommendation are positive (2). 
The model (3) seeks to capture two distinct effects, one due to the serial position of the rec 
ommendations and the  other due to the total number of  recommendations in an assessment. 
However these variables are not orthogonal as the correlation between them is 0.51. Consequent 
ly, to get a better understanding of these individual effects we evaluate two versions of model 
(3). In the first version the serial position of a recommendation is used as is, in the second ver 
sion the serial position of a recommendation is normalized within an assessment so that it equals 
one at its mean. For instance, in an assessment with five recommendation the serial positions will 
be recorded as 1,2,3,4, and 5 in the first version while it will be recorded as 1/3, 2/3,1,4/3, and 
5/3 in the second version. Both specifications have advantages and disadvantages. 
To validate the instruments for each version of model (3), we run a simple OLS regression of 
the variables for serial position of the recommendation on the instruments related to the ARC 
code and the IACs propensity to make a type of recommendation. The R
2 we obtain for this re 
gression is 0.23 for the first version and 0.04 for the second version. For the first version this is 
comparable to similar values reported in the literature, e.g. Evans and Schwab (1995) report R
2 
of 0.16 when they regress their endogenous variable (catholic school) on their instrument (catho 
lic religion). We also ran an ordered probit model for the first version. The z stat for the instru 
ment related to ARC code and the IAC’s propensity to make a type of recommendation is 91.90 
and 70.64 respectively and both are statistically significant at p<0.001. Therefore the chosen in 
struments are valid determinants of the serial position of the recommendations for the first ver 
sion of model (3). The validity of the instruments for the second version of model (3) is not 
clearly established and we proceed under the assumption that we have weak instruments for the 
second version. Work in Progress; For Submission to Management Science (Nov 2008) 
 
  17
For both versions, we evaluate two probit models for the Payback model discussed in (1): 
one where the variable Si is treated as exogenous and the other where it is treated as endogenous. 
The models are labeled Exog_PB and Endog_PB respectively. Similarly for both versions, we 
evaluate two probit models for the Cost Benefit model discussed in (1) and label the models Ex 
og_CB and Endog_CB. Table 4 and 5 presents the results for the four models with the first and 
second specification for the sequence variable respectively. 
6.  Discussion, Implications and Limitations 
In this section, we present our main results related to our five hypotheses, draw implica 
tions of from our results and then discuss limitations and alternative explanations for our study. 
With respect to our hypothesis on managerial myopia we appeal to the summary statistics in Ta 
ble 1, where we observe that nearly half the recommendations are not implemented despite the 
fact that average payback for the recommendations is just over a year. From the results of the 
nonparametric sign test in Table 2 we see that the median rates of return for the unrealized rec 
ommendations  are  significantly  higher  than  the  cost  of  trade  credit,  one  of  most  expensive 
sources of funds available to small business managers. Further, the median rate of return for rec 
ommendations not implemented is 84% which is a very attractive proposition considering any 
rational investment hurdle rate. These observations provide support for hypothesis 1 that manag 
ers are myopic and indeed miss out on many profitable energy saving opportunities. This is in 
line with existing literature; our contribution is that we build on this by identifying that returns 
for the unrealized opportunities are higher than one of the most expensive sources of funds avail 
able to managers. This is relevant for the IAC program which aims to improve energy efficiency 
of small and medium sized firms. The objectives of the program may not be met by just provid 
ing information on profitable energy efficiency opportunities.  Additional factors, as highlighted 
in the discussions of our subsequent hypotheses, need to be considered to improve adoption of 
energy efficiency initiatives. 
With respect to our other hypotheses we draw inferences from the results for the Conditional 
Logit model provided in Table 3 and the results for the Probit models provided in Tables 4 and 5. 
We observe that the coefficients for the cost variables are significant larger than those for the 
savings variables in the Exog_CB and Endog_CB models in Tables 4 and 5 and the Cost Benefit 
model in Table 3. Further the coefficients for the savings variables are not significant in the in Work in Progress; For Submission to Management Science (Nov 2008) 
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strumental  variables  probit  model.  These  observations  provide  support  for  hypothesis  2  that 
managers are influenced more by initial costs than by net benefits when evaluating energy effi 
ciency opportunities. This is similar to Anderson and Newell (2004), but we build on their mod 
els by incorporating variables related to the uncertainty of the returns and to underlying beha 
vioral factors that influence the adoption decision. This has significant implications for the IAC 
program as well as other initiatives where managers are provided costs and savings for invest 
ment opportunities. Given the high focus managers place on costs, it may be prudent to present 
the total lifetime savings of a recommendation rather than to present the annual savings.  
To evaluate our hypothesis related to the risk associated with a recommendation we incorpo 
rated a new variable, the variance of the payback of a recommendation, in our model. We com 
pute the variance of payback of a specific type of recommendation i as ∑j [(Payback)ij (Average 
Payback)i]
2, where j represents all firms in our dataset that were given recommendation i. We 
observe the coefficients for the variance of payback are significant and have a negative sign in all 
the models in Tables 3, 4 and 5. This supports our hypothesis that the variance in payback will 
have a negative impact on adoption rates. 
With regards to our hypothesis on the order effects we observe that the average adoption rate 
falls for recommendations that occur later in the report as demonstrated in Figure 2, from over 
50% for the earliest recommendations to around 40% for the last ones. Further, we observe that 
the coefficients of the serial position of the recommendation are significant and have a negative 
sign across all models in Tables 3, 4, and 5. The negative coefficients for the serial position vari 
able indicate that the probability of implementation falls as the recommendation occurs later in 
the report. For instance, in Table 4 for the Endog_CB model if we consider an assessment where 
the recommendation is moved from the fourth position to the fifth position in the report then its 
probability of adoption will fall by 0.119. This is the same effect as will be achieved by increas 
ing the cost of implementation by $28,984 from the average level of $20,767. Further in Tables 4 
and 5, the coefficient of the serial position is over 4 times larger for the endogenous model than 
for the exogenous models. This indicates that the impact of the serial position in the exogenous 
model tends to be understated due to the correlation with the error terms. Overall this supports 
hypothesis 4 that the serial position of the recommendation has a significant impact on its adop 
tion and recommendations that appear later in the report have lower rates of adoption as com 
pared to those that occur earlier in the report.  Work in Progress; For Submission to Management Science (Nov 2008) 
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As the recommendation order variable is also related to the total number of recommenda 
tions, a possible concern may be that the effect we identified is in fact due to the total number of 
recommendations. To address this we formed groups of all recommendations with the same total 
number of recommendations and then we redid the probit instrumental variables analysis within 
each group. The results of this analysis also support the inference that the sequence of recom 
mendations is significant in explaining the adoption rates. Additionally the results indicate the 
presence of primacy effects. This result has significant implications for the IAC program and for 
other contexts where a collection of process improvement opportunities are presented to decision 
makers. As the serial position of the recommendation has a significant effect on the adoption 
rate, the IAC teams must take particular care in how they present the recommendations to the 
manufacturing firms. A possible strategy could be to include recommendations that have larger 
energy savings earlier in the report; this will increase the adoption rates of these recommenda 
tions and provide higher energy savings. This implication may also carry over to other business 
contexts, such as consultants providing reports to clients, or firms providing retirement saving 
options to their employees, or internet firms providing choices to prospective customers, etc. In 
all these situations decision makers are exposed to a set of choices and are possibly influenced by 
the sequence in which those choices are presented to them.  
In the context of our hypothesis on the total number of recommendations provided to manag 
ers we see that the coefficient of the number of recommendations is positive  and significant at 
p<0.001 in three models in Table 4 while the coefficients are negative but not significant at that 
level in any of the models in Table 5. This contradicts hypothesis 5 which predicts that adoption 
rate will be higher for recommendations that are part of a smaller assessment.  
Contrary to our theoretical prediction we do not find decreased adoption rates for recommen 
dations in assessments with a larger total number of recommendations. A possible concern with 
this result may be that the serial position of the recommendation is masking the effect of the 
number of recommendations. To address this concern we formed groups of all recommendations 
with the same serial position value and then we estimated a probit model of the adoption rates 
within each group separately. The results of this analysis also confirm that the total number of 
recommendations is not significant in explaining the adoption rates. Further we appeal to the 
chart presented in Figure 3 where we observe that nearly 50% of the recommendations are im 
plemented irrespective of the number of recommendations made to a firm. This might indicate Work in Progress; For Submission to Management Science (Nov 2008) 
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that decision makers are not adopting a choice heuristic as suggested by Iyengar and Lepper 
(2000) but are adopting some other simplifying heuristic (Gilovich et al. 2002) which prompts 
them to adopt on average half of all recommendations they receive. Note though that there is a 
substantial variance around the average adoption rate of 50%; further research could take a firm 
based perspective to explain variation in adoption patterns across firms, rather than the recom 
mendation level analysis we do here. This result also may have implications for situations in 
which a list of recommendations is provided to operations managers. In many instances consul 
tants tend to focus on providing a few critical recommendations in the belief that adoption may 
increase if the set of choices is limited. However, as demonstrated here, operations managers do 
not seem to be overwhelmed by choices, consequently it may be advisable to present all oppor 
tunities. 
A possible alternative explanation for our results is that firms might plan to adopt all the rec 
ommendations but decide to do so in the sequence in which the recommendations are presented. 
Hence when the IACs contact them to check on the implementation status they would have im 
plemented recommendations which were presented early in the report. This would be consistent 
with our findings as this would imply that firms are using the sequencing of recommendations to 
guide their adoption sequence decision as opposed to deciding that based on the merits of a rec 
ommendation.  
A possible cause for concern may be that some unobserved costs of implementation which 
are not included in the analysis are driving the results. The only way this is addressed in this 
study is by controlling for the recommendation types, but this is not a comprehensive and robust 
approach and remains as a possible limitation of this study. However given the heterogeneity of 
firm types based on their standard industrial classifications and the wide variety of recommenda 
tions we do not believe such unobserved costs, if any, would be present across all recommenda 
tion in such a way as to systematically bias our results. 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we analyze the adoption of energy efficiency related process improvement initi 
atives resulting from recommendations made to small and medium sized firms and find evidence 
related to four biases in the adoption of these initiatives. First, managers miss out on many prof 
itable energy efficiency initiatives. Our contribution is to highlight that these profitable oppor Work in Progress; For Submission to Management Science (Nov 2008) 
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tunities have rates of return which are significantly higher than the most expensive cost of funds 
mentioned in the literature. Second, managers are more influenced by initial costs than by net 
befits when evaluating such initiatives. We highlight this in an econometric model after incorpo 
rating variables that capture the behavioral issues influencing the underlying decision and the 
uncertainty associated with the returns of a recommendation. Third, the sequence in which the 
recommendations are presented influences adoption rates: recommendations which appear early 
on in a list of recommendations have higher rates of adoption as compared to those which appear 
later in the list. This study contributes by highlighting behavior in the decision context of choos 
ing from a list of alternatives in an operational context. This is a commonly encountered problem 
in operations and this is one of the first studies to investigate this problem.  Fourth, we also find 
that adoption is not influenced by the number of options provided to decision makers, contrary to 
theoretical predictions. This finding runs contrary to earlier studies which have analyzed these 
problems in the context of consumer choices and individual investment decisions. Our study thus 
highlights biases which have been previously unobserved in the operations context. Moreover 
since most of the energy saving recommendations relate to some form of operational process im 
provements, our findings have broader implications for the adoption of process improvements in 
operations. Better understanding of these biases and underlying managerial behavior may facili 
tate the adoption of process improvement initiatives across general operational settings. Finally 
we contribute to the behavioral operations literature by studying behavioral issues using actual 
field data as opposed to the majority of the studies which use experimental data. 
An intriguing area for further research would be to identify similar groups of firms who may 
have comparable efficiency improvement requirements and then see if the adoption varies with 
the order of the recommendations and the number of the recommendations. This would require a 
controlled field experiment and would provide greater support and insights leading to the deci 
sion of adoption. 
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Figure 1: Energy Savings Implemented as a Percentage of Total Savings  
Recommended 
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(Over 50% of energy savings recommended are not implemented. Moreover, the percentage of 
energy savings implemented is decreasing over time) 
 
 
Figure 2: Adoption Rate vs. Serial Position of Recommendation in the Report 
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th position in a report. Work in Progress; For Submission to Management Science (Nov 2008) 
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Figure 3: Adoption Rate vs. Number of Recommendations in an Assessment 
On an average around half the recommendations are implemented irrespective of the number of 
recommendations made to a firm 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean S.D Minimum Maximum
Adopted** 0.5001 0.50 0 1
Payback (years) 1.0579 1.29 0 9
Implementation Cost (US$) 20,766.82 301,632.42 0 55,429,808
Annual Savings (US$) 19,296.85 130,001.21 1.12 8,519,905
Annual Sales (US $) 41,729,814.57 247,954,127.97 0 25,000,000,000
Employees 175.02 177.78 0* 5,800
Floor Area (square feet) 201,027.04 2,592,045.59 0* 150,000,000
Annual Energy Cost (US$) 727,867.34 2,643,844.22 0* 189,742,848
Statistics are based on data for the 92,723 recommendations, representing 12,703 assessments. 
Monetary figures are in 2006 US Dollars
** Adopted =1 if the recommendation is implemented and 0 otherwise  
 
* Note: Data is missing and coded as 0 for :  1) Annual Sales (755 records), 2) Employees (101 
records)  3) Floor Area (26,596 records). All the analysis has also been done by removing the 
missing data and the results of the study are still valid.  
 
 Work in Progress; For Submission to Management Science (Nov 2008) 
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Table 2: Sign Test for Paired Comparisons: Median Rates of Return for Unrealized Rec-
ommendations vs. Cost of Trade Credit 
Sign
Observed Returns for 
Recommendations as 
Compared to Cost of 
Trade Credit
Expected Returns for 
Recommendations as 
Compared to Cost of 
Trade Credit
Positive                           
(Returns are More Than 
Cost of Trade Credit)
23907 18746
Negative                          
(Returns are Less Than 
Cost of Trade Credit)
13585 18746
Total 37492 37492
One-sided tests:
Ho: Median Rate of Return of Unrealized Opportunities is Equal to Cost of Trade Credit
Ha: Median Rate of Return of Unrealized Opportunities is More Than Cost of Trade Credit
p Value =0.000
Two-sided test:
Ho: Median Rate of Return of Unrealized Opportunities is Equal to Cost of Trade Credit
Ha: Median Rate of Return of Unrealized Opportunities is Not Equal to Cost of Trade Credit
p Value =0.000  
 
Data pertains to recommendations made by IAC centers from 1981 2006. 37,492 recommendations that were not 
implemented are used in the analysis. 2790 unrealized recommendations were excluded in this analysis as their in 
ternal rates of return were over 100 and 17 unrealized  recommendations were excluded as their payback were nega 
tive and 6068 unrealized recommendations were excluded as their cost figures were recorded as zero. Including 
these recommendations in this analysis does not alter the inferences. 
 Work in Progress; For Submission to Management Science (Nov 2008) 
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Table 3: Conditional Fixed Effects Logit Estimates of Adoption of Recommendations 
Conditional Logit Models
Payback Cost-Benefit   
ln(Payback) -0.3124***                
(0.023)                
ln(Payback)^2 -0.0348***                
(0.005)                
ln(Cost) -0.2868***
(0.018)
ln(Cost)^2 -0.0170***
(0.002)
ln(Saving) 0.1246***
(0.017)
ln(Saving)^2 -0.0032
(0.003)
Serial -0.0424*** -0.0550***
(0.004) (0.004)
Number*Payback 0.0124 -0.0470***
(0.017) (0.013)
Variance -0.1566*** -0.1252***
(0.014) (0.014)
Controls:
Recommendation Type (Number significant at 
p<0.001 out of 25 recommendation types) 0 0
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 61955 61955
Log-Likelihood -25437.613*** -25348.141***
Likelihood-Ratio 3304.1 3326.8
standard errors are in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Dependent Variable : Adopted (equals 1 if implemented 0 otherwise)
 
 
Data pertains to recommendations made by IAC centers from 1981 2006. Dependent variable is the implementation 
status of a recommendation   Adopted equals 1 if recommendation is implemented and equals 0 otherwise. Estima 
tion method is maximum likelihood conditional fixed effects. Standard errors reported are using robust clustered 
variance covariance matrix. Each model is estimated for an effective sample of 9310 plants representing 61955 rec 
ommendations. 3362 plants (17090 recommendations) were dropped from the full sample due to their having no 
variation in whether the recommendations were adopted or not. 13678 recommendations were dropped as they have 
payback less than or equal to zero and the logarithmic form for payback is not defined. Including these recommen 
dations in a model without logarithmic transformation does not change the inferences we derive from this model. Work in Progress; For Submission to Management Science (Nov 2008) 
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Table 4: Instrumental Variables Probit Estimates of Adoption of Recommendations (Version : Ab-
solute Serial Position) 
Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit
Exog_PB Endog_PB Exog_CB Endog_CB   
ln(Payback) -0.1468 *** -0.1091 ***
(0.0107) (0.0159)
ln(Payback)^2 -0.0164 *** -0.0152 ***
(0.0022) (0.0022)
ln(Cost) -0.1392 *** -0.1291 ***
(0.0085) (0.0090)
ln(Cost)^2 -0.0084 *** -0.0076 ***
(0.0011) (0.0011)
ln(Saving) 0.0609 *** 0.0201
(0.0084) (0.0131)
ln(Saving)^2 -0.0013 0.0017
(0.0014) (0.0016)
Serial Position -0.0202 *** -0.1661 *** -0.0259 *** -0.1212 ***
(0.0018) (0.0366) (0.0019) (0.0225)
Number 0.0367 0.6253 *** 0.0911 *** 0.4728 ***
(0.0266) (0.1484) (0.0261) (0.0924)
Number*Payback -0.0001 0.0037 -0.0276 *** -0.0223 ***
(0.0079) (0.0083) (0.0060) (0.0063)
Variance of Payback -0.0789 *** -0.1189 *** -0.0629 *** -0.0713 ***
(0.0073) (0.0115) (0.0072) (0.0073)
Sales -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Employees -0.0093 -0.0032 0.0034 0.0133
(0.0071) (0.0070) (0.0072) (0.0077)
Plant Area 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0006
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Controls
0 0 0 1
34 28 32 28
0 0 0 0
Observations 78811 78811 78811 78811
Firms (Assessments) 12628 12628 12628 12628
Log-PseudoLikelihood -51559.68 *** -233288.62 *** -51432.89 *** -229840.68 ***
Exogeneity_Wald_Stat 12.96 16.67
standard errors are in parantheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Dependent Variable : Adopted (equals 1 if implemented, 0 otherwise)
Recommendation Type (No. significant at 
p<0.001 out of 25 recommendation types)
IAC Centers (No. significant at p<0.001 out 
of 45 IAC centers)
Years (No. significant at p<0.001 out of 26 
Years)
 
Data pertains to recommendations made by IAC centers from 1981 2006. Dependent variable is the implementation status of a recommendation   
Adopted equals 1 if recommendation is implemented and equals 0 otherwise. Estimation method is Maximum Likelihood. Standard errors re 
ported are using robust clustered variance covariance matrix. 1 IAC center and its 12 related recommendations were dropped from the full sample 
due to their having no variation in whether the recommendations were adopted or not. 13656 recommendations were dropped as they has payback 
less than or equal to zero and the logarithmic form for payback is not defined. Including these recommendations in a model without logarithmic 
transformation does not change the inferences we derive from this model. Also 256 recommendations with sic two digit codes less than 20 and 
more than 39 were not included in the analysis reported here. Including them does not change the inferences obtained from the models. Work in Progress; For Submission to Management Science (Nov 2008) 
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Table  5:  Instrumental  Variables  Probit  Estimates  of  Adoption  of  Recommendations  (Version: 
Normalized Serial Position) 
Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit
Exog_PB Endog_PB Exog_CB Endog_CB   
ln(Payback) -0.1457 *** -0.0272                
(0.0107) (0.0165)                
ln(Payback)^2 -0.0163 *** -0.0081 ***                
(0.0022) (0.0022)                
ln(Cost) -0.1388 *** -0.107 ***
(0.0085) (0.0098)
ln(Cost)^2 -0.0084 *** -0.006 ***
(0.0011) (0.0011)
ln(Saving) 0.06 *** -0.0294 *
(0.0084) (0.0135)
ln(Saving)^2 -0.0012 0.0052 ***
(0.0014) (0.0016)
Serial Position (Normalized) -0.1099 *** -1.5978 *** -0.1403 *** -1.1074 ***
(0.0091) (0.1040) (0.0096) (0.1046)
Number -0.0454 -0.0448 * -0.0148 -0.0268
(0.0254) (0.0187) (0.0248) (0.0225)
Number*Payback -0.0006 -0.0018 -0.0277 *** -0.0181 **
(0.0079) (0.0072) (0.0060) (0.0060)
Variance of Payback -0.0797 *** -0.1496 *** -0.0633 *** -0.0778 ***
(0.0073) (0.0082) (0.0072) (0.0071)
Sales -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Employees -0.0095 0.0004 0.0034 0.025 ***
(0.0071) (0.0052) (0.0072) (0.0074)
Plant Area 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004 0.0006
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Controls
0 0 1 3
30 18 30 18
0 0 0 0
Observations 78811 78811 78811 78811
Firms (Assessments) 12628 12628 12628 12628
Log-PseudoLikelihood -51551.82 *** -105018.04 *** -51422.18 *** -101532.69 ***
Exogeneity_Wald_Stat 66.53 60.98
standard errors are in parantheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Recommendation Type (No. significant at 
p<0.001 out of 25 recommendation types)
IAC Centers (No. significant at p<0.001 out 
of 45 IAC centers)
Years (No. significant at p<0.001 out of 26 
Years)
Dependent Variable : Adopted (equals 1 if implemented, 0 otherwise)
 
Data pertains to recommendations made by IAC centers from 1981 2006. Dependent variable is the implementation status of a recommendation   
Adopted equals 1 if recommendation is implemented and equals 0 otherwise. Estimation method is Maximum Likelihood. Standard errors re 
ported are using robust clustered variance covariance matrix. 1 IAC center and its 12 related recommendations were dropped from the full sample 
due to their having no variation in whether the recommendations were adopted or not. 13656 recommendations were dropped as they has payback 
less than or equal to zero and the logarithmic form for payback is not defined. Including these recommendations in a model without logarithmic 
transformation does not change the inferences we derive from this model. Also 256 recommendations with sic two digit codes less than 20 and 
more than 39 were not included in the analysis reported here. Including them does not change the inferences obtained from the models. 